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T he ongoing financial crisis and a difficult international adjustmentprocess involve a multitude of actors and forums. They all grapple withthe complexities of a globalized economic and financial system and the
challenges arising from the financial turmoil and economic downturn. Gov-
ernments have responded with unilateral, bilateral, or regional actions. Major
central banks have cooperated on an ad hoc basis, and the G7 and the G-20 have
attempted to provide economic stewardship. But the considerable spillovers
and policy interdependence in a globalized economy that were already visible
in the run-up to the turmoil have shown that the international monetary and
financial system needs an effective steering committee to address such spill-
overs and facilitate cooperation on global economic matters.
For decades, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was at the helm of the
international monetary system. However, an alleged unequal treatment of its mem-
bers, an ever expanding mandate diluting its core responsibilities, complacency in
its policy advice, and the dominance of its governance by some large countries
have more and more sidelined the IMF in the international policy debate. While
the actions by the G7 may have been sufficient to address economic shocks in the
past, the emergence of new economic players in Latin America, Eastern Europe,
and Asia necessitates a fresh look at how to address global economic challenges,
which involve a rising number of systemically important players.
The IMF has realized that it risks being sidelined in global economic af-
fairs and is now in its fourth year of a strategic review of its setup and activi-
ties, with the declared objective of regaining its position as the “steward of
international financial cooperation and stability” and putting itself firmly at
the center of the international monetary system. Progress is under way: The
IMF is strengthening its surveillance by deepening the analysis of interlinkages,
including exchange rates, in its bilateral economic surveillance. It is placing
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more focus on macrofinancial linkages. Moreover, it is reviewing its lending in-
struments to adapt to the requirements of Fund members, and it is also revising
its leading role. As far as IMF resources are concerned, there is broad agreement
among the membership that the Fund’s lending capacity needs to be substan-
tially increased. While discussions continue on the precise amounts and modal-
ities, Japan and the EU have announced that they will provide loans to the Fund
in the order of US$100 billion each; a response from the US is still outstanding.
Will these reform steps be sufficient to restore the IMF as the central in-
stitution for international monetary cooperation? This is to be doubted. The cru-
cial element that is missing to complete the reforms is an overhaul in the
governance of the IMF and, in particular, in the structure and functioning of the
executive board to transform this body into an effective and legitimate forum
for dealing with global economic issues. The only step undertaken in this con-
text was to update the byzantine way of calculating quotas; that is, countries’
shares in the Fund, in spring 2008. This topic had occupied IMF bodies for over
two years and resulted in a shift of 2.7 percent of the votes from advanced to
emerging and developing economies. The reform is a good illustration of the
proverbial elephant giving birth to a mouse, because it abstracted from changes
to the structure and functioning of the board that are much more relevant than
small adjustments in voting rights of a body that rarely takes formal votes.1 In
principle, the IMF executive board is uniquely placed to provide authoritative
guidance to IMF member countries, exert peer pressure, and give economic
policy advice. Being in continuous session, it receives up-to-date information
on developments in member countries as well as in the global economy. It has
an overview of different policy frameworks and economic policy tools and is
aware of the constraints of domestic policymaking, all of which can facilitate
tailoring its advice to specific countries. However, as we show in this article,
the board is unconditionally overwhelmed by its tasks and responsibilities and
too large to be an effective forum for true international economic dialogue.
Therefore, if there is no adjustment in the structure and functioning of the ex-
ecutive board, the final objective of IMF reform will be missed. The Fund will be-
come more efficient, but it will not be more effective in providing a high-level
forum for international economic cooperation in which peer pressure can be exerted
also on systemically relevant economies, including the Fund’s largest members
whose macroeconomic and financial policies are prone to create important inter-
national spillovers. Without a change in its governance, the IMF will continue to
lose clout at the expense of informal groupings, such as the G7 and G-20, that are
potentially more effective and flexible but that do not have universal status.
* * *
A brief look at the current organization and working modalities of the twenty-
four-member executive board shows how implausible it is to conjecture that the
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board will take on a more central role in the international monetary system.
Mandated by the board of governors,2 the executive board is the IMF’s per-
manent decisionmaking organ and conducts the day-to-day business of the
IMF. In principle, it has a central role in policy formulation and oversight of
the international monetary system. However, there are several shortcomings
with the current setup and structure.
Some executive directors retain a significant degree of freedom in devel-
oping positions they represent at the board, while others mainly transmit views
from their capital. This limits their maneuvering room in discussions and ne-
gotiations. Many directors are midlevel officials from a country’s ministry of
finance or central bank, which reduces their authority to decide independently
or to exert proper peer pressure. Some directors enjoy long tenures of a decade
or more. They develop considerable expertise also on the internal IMF issues
but, by implication, are at times rather remote from member countries’ poli-
cymaking. Most IMF member countries are grouped into one of the sixteen
constituencies represented on the board, but the eight most important countries
in the IMF have their own director, which means that the interests of the large
countries can be represented much more effectively.
On top comes the daunting and complex workload that the executive
board faces. The board usually convenes three times a week to discuss all the
different facets of IMF activities. In 2007, the board held over 200 meetings,
received a total of more than 70,000 pages of documents, and produced over
10,000 pages. Typically, the agenda is filled with the review of bilateral sur-
veillance and lending cases. After all, the board has to go through about 180
country surveillance reports each year, noting that countries receiving IMF fi-
nancial assistance are reviewed up to four times per year. In addition, the board
regularly assesses the IMF’s own policies and instruments and has to deal with
new tasks, such as anti–money laundering initiatives or the impact of climate
change on members’ economic policies. This plethora of topics invariably
leads to a crowding out of the executive board’s prime function of multilateral
surveillance, on which the board spends only 6 percent of its time.3
* * *
Not surprisingly, proposals to strengthen the board abound. Most of these
proposals focus on reducing the size of the board, improving the pattern of
country representation, upgrading the status of members, and strengthening
the independence and accountability of its members. Other contributions sug-
gest enlarging the board to give more voice to, especially, developing coun-
tries. Some contributions contain proposals to boost effectiveness through
greater delegation to staff or subcommittees. Finally, there are proposals 
to complement the board through an agenda-setting “supercommittee” like a
council.4
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All these proposals rest on the assumption that a single executive board is
sufficient to perform the great number of various tasks in an efficient and
legitimate manner. One simply has to find the right size and level of represen-
tation, as well as the right mode of operation, and the board will be able to deal
effectively with all its tasks. We doubt that this assumption is sound: even after
the different elements of the medium-term strategy are put into practice, the
board will continue to be confronted with an overwhelming and excessively
complex workload. Unless its current one-size-fits-all structure is appropriately
reformed, the board will not become the key policy forum for global economic
and financial issues.
Our proposal is fundamentally different from those in the literature: we
argue that the highly diverse tasks of the IMF, to be implemented effectively,
require different governance structures. We believe that the optimal number of
governing bodies for the ongoing IMF work is not one but two, duly distin-
guishing between multilateral matters and country-related matters. Specifi-
cally, we propose to split the tasks that are predominantly systemic in nature
from those that are primarily country focused and technical, and we believe
that this can be done. Two different boards would be dealing with these issues:
a systemic issues board and a country issues board.
The systemic issues board would supervise the setup and functioning of
the international monetary and financial system and identify related policy im-
plications. The conduct of multilateral surveillance would become its central
task. Guided by various inputs provided by Fund staff including the World
Economic Outlook, the Global Financial Stability Report, reports on exchange
rates, and the multilateral consultation process on systemic and horizontal is-
sues this board would assess global risks stemming from the rising integration
of national economies into the global economy. These risks pertain in particu-
lar to market and policy spillovers that have a bearing on the stability of the in-
ternational monetary and financial system. Moreover, this board would be in
charge of developing a consensus on policy measures to address the challenges
posed by globalization. With its clear focus and mandate, the systemic issues
board would become the key forum for global monetary consultation.
This mandate requires that the board be comparatively small in size but re-
tain universal status. We suggest twelve executive directors representing the
main regions of the global economy. The size corresponds to Keynes’s original
proposal for the IMF’s board and would be half that of today’s board, thus al-
lowing much greater interaction and dialogue. Importantly, and in contrast to
the G7 or G-20, this board would reflect the Fund’s universal membership, as
all executive directors would represent multiple-country constituencies com-
prising regional geographic groupings.5 It would mean that the constituency sys-
tem, which has been operating successfully at the Fund for sixty years, would be
applied consistently to all executive directors.6 Moreover, and fundamentally
different from the G7 or G-20, the board would form part of a fully legitimate
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and universal international organization, rather than an ad hoc grouping, and
would be regularly supported by input from IMF staff and management. 
Its members should be senior officials from member countries with suffi-
cient political clout and authority to act independently. These officials would
be elected for a period of some years by members of each constituency and
typically could be second in command at treasuries or central banks. They
could be those who are involved in other key international economic and fi-
nancial forums (e.g., G7, G-20, or G-24 deputies) to guarantee consistency of
policy advice and prescriptions; they should also be closely linked to decision-
makers in their constituencies. Chaired by one of its members, the systemic is-
sues board would be a nonresident board and would meet on a regular basis,
perhaps three or four times per year. The managing director would be invited
to its sessions to provide a close nexus with the country issues board.
The systemic issues board would address two main areas of criticism made
vis-à-vis the Fund, namely, that it is not effectively providing a central forum
for global monetary cooperation and that it has paid insufficient attention to
multilateral surveillance such as the systemic implications of macroeconomic
policies of large economies.7 With sufficiently senior representation, there would
be less of a desire to outsource policy issues pertaining to global monetary co-
operation to other forums. With its focus on the multilateral dimension of sur-
veillance, adequate treatment would be given to economic and financial
linkages among countries, and with its higher level of representation, the key
tool of the Fund peer pressure would be used more effectively. Effective peer
pressure is especially important vis-à-vis the larger economies, since it is they
that create important externalities and spillovers. The current financial turmoil,
which affects the global economy in its totality, is a clear case in point. The sys-
temic issues board could alleviate such risks and push for early policy correc-
tion by convening at one table the critical mass of those countries in the global
economy that are potentially affected.
The country issues board would retain the main features of the current ex-
ecutive board. It would conduct the Fund’s bilateral surveillance activities and
run the organization’s day-to-day business. Moreover, it would focus on issues
such as capacity building; that is, technical assistance and training as well as
structural and crisis lending within access limits. As far as the Fund’s day-to-
day business is concerned, this board would be responsible for all administra-
tive matters and decide inter alia on the Fund’s budget. In sum, it would be in
charge of all issues not explicitly relegated to the board of governors or the
systemic issues board.
Its working focus implies that the country issues board can be more inclu-
sive. Since it does not focus on horizontal issues but rather discusses one country
case at a time, it could even be enlarged, when compared to today’s situation,
to foster its legitimacy. One could envisage creating additional chairs ex-
clusively for developing countries from Africa, Latin America, and Asia to
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increase their effective participation in this body. At the same time, even a par-
tial consolidation of Europe’s fragmented representation to reflect growing eco-
nomic cohesion on this continent would allow reducing the number of chairs by
at least a few.8 This could return the board size to its current situation. In line
with current practice, this body would be a resident board and be chaired by the
managing director. The workload of the country issues board could be allevi-
ated by a more rigorous recourse to a committee substructure along functional
lines such as structural lending, technical assistance, or policy issues.
The larger country issues board would have more resources and time to
devote to country matters, including the Fund’s role in low-income countries
and its overall advice to member countries. Emerging and developing econo-
mies would have more chairs at the table and thus have a greater voice in dis-
cussions on country issues, especially when it comes to the Fund’s role in
developing economies. Double-majority voting in this board could further in-
crease further the legitimacy of IMF policy recommendations and foster own-
ership by member countries.
The governance setup we propose here is unique because there are no pre-
cursors, either nationally or internationally. Operating the IMF with a dual
board structure will clearly entail challenges. The delineation of responsibilities
between the two boards would need to be respected to avoid gaps and overlaps.
The multilateral issues would be brought to the systemic issues board, and all
country-related matters, as well as others (IMF policies, budget, and the like),
would be assigned to the country issues board. The two boards would be in-
formed of each other’s proceedings. To ensure that this delineation of respon-
sibilities is in line with the goal of achieving consistent and compatible policy
recommendations, the agendas of the two boards would be coordinated, in-
cluding a clustering of treatment of countries in a region or of systemic econ-
omies. This would neatly feed into the deliberations of the systemic issues
board and its task of identifying multilateral challenges.
* * *
There is a clear need to put the Fund firmly back at the center of the interna-
tional monetary system. The proposed institutional change would strengthen
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the executive board as a forum for multilat-
eral policy debate and, as a consequence, reinforce the central position of the
IMF in the governance of the international monetary system. Such an outcome
would be highly advantageous given that the stability of the system crucially
hinges on having in place and at its center a legitimate and effective IMF. c
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